How Egypt Can Still Realise Its Democratic Dream

Tarek Shafey

Last Updated: 3, October 2013

Please note that we are not authorised to provide any investment advice. The content on this page is for information purposes only.

High among the causes of Egypt’s two popular revolutions of January 2011 and June 2013 was a demand for an honest, efficient and democratic government. However, with only an experience of partial democracy from 1923-52, and during ex-President Morsi’s bad and unpopular regime of 2012-13, true democracy will not come easily to Egypt.

High incidence of poverty, and an illiteracy rate of 20-25 percent, are among the obstacles to a smooth democratic transition, but as in constructing high-rise buildings, the necessary time and thought are needed to design and build safe and sturdy foundations for the future.

Egypt’s constitution is currently under official review, with some change expected, but much more is needed. The current constitution is too deeply undemocratic for insufficient alterations. Meaningful change, along with healthy, open and imaginative national debate, would serve Egypt better.

This article proposes a framework for a fair, safe, balanced and efficient electoral system, bolstered by democratic, decentralized and improved national and provincial governance. An important and often underrated part of this process would be to learn from the experiences of many established and more recent democracies worldwide.

A good start would be to identify the main drawbacks of Egypt’s politics and governance. The current system gives Egypt’s president excessive and extensive power and authority, coupled with limited accountability. The state is also over-centralized – concentrating provincial resource allocation, authority and decision-making within the central government in Cairo.

[quote]The two tendencies above have characterized Egypt for most of its 5,100 years as a nation and state, and this must now change. Many Members of Parliament (MPs) have been insufficiently qualified. The voting system of mostly single-winner constituencies gives lopsided, dangerous landslide wins to the largest party, and encourages vote-winning local patronage by wealthy individuals, local clans and strongmen, and powerful party bosses. [/quote]

The complex, current voting procedure also confuses many voters and drives down their turnout, and finally, for decades Egypt’s women and Christian have been starkly under-represented and marginalized. Effective political reforms must address all these defects, as well as counteract their own potential side-effects.

Table of Contents

Electoral Reform

Egypt’s top political priority must be to avoid the emergence of a new dictator, and a parliamentary system of four year terms is the cornerstone that would suit Egypt better than the main alternatives; namely 1) A presidential system as in the USA, or 2) A power-splitting, mixed presidential/parliamentary system, as in France.

A US-modeled system has two main risks. Political gridlock can occur if the president and parliament are in mutual opposition, and indeed this often does happen in the USA. But a greater risk for Egypt would be of the president amassing and abusing power. His/her status as the head and symbol of the state, and army Commander-in-Chief (CIC), would give him/her higher prestige, popularity and power than the MPs. This happened often in Latin American countries, harming their democracies and national interests.

Likewise, a mixed, French-style system is inherently unstable and risky. The president and Prime Minister (PM) would tussle over power, especially if they are politically and ideologically opposed. This did happen in France, most notably in 1986-88 and 1993-95. On both occasions the president prevailed, and in Egypt (s)he would most likely score a decisive and dangerous win.

In a parliamentary system, it is possible to counteract its two main risks, namely 1) Unstable coalition governments and frequent early elections, as has often occurred in Italy and Israel, and conversely, 2) A high-handed mindset and behavior by a powerful PM with an entrenched parliamentary majority, as in Iraq. As in most European countries, Egypt would be governed by the PM, who would serve a personal maximum of eight years, but have a watchdog head of state, senior to him/her and also CIC of an army with a leadership bound by an oath of loyalty to the constitution.

This arrangement would prevent a PM-led coup d’état or illegal power grab. The president would serve as the primary defender of the constitution and democratic process, but would be constitutionally forbidden to unilaterally dismiss the PM or governments, dissolve parliament, govern or seize power in any way. The president, elected by popular vote and serving a maximum of two, four-year terms, would ideally be an experienced and respected statesman, such as Turkey’s Abdullah Gul or Portugal’s Anibal Cavaco Silva. The president would observe strict political neutrality, with no formal party affiliation, endorsement or election campaigning by him/her.

With the PM holding the real power, the president must enjoy occupational protection, with a high bar for impeaching and unseating him/her. This would only be allowed if the president were proven to have violated the law or constitution, or engaged in corruption. Two separate, 2/3 parliament majority votes for impeachment and unseating would be required, and approved by a 2/3 majority vote in the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). In that case, the Vice-President would step in and serve out the presidential term. If (s)he has also been indicted, then the SCC President would serve as caretaker president and call a fresh presidential election for the end of the parliamentary cycle.

A single-chamber parliament of 160 well-educated and qualified MPs, each serving a personal maximum of 12 years, is recommended, with parliament recess in July-August and mid-December to mid-January. The quota of 50 percent of seats for workers and peasants is a decades-old socialist relic, and in Egypt has unfortunately been abused as a loophole to sneak in corrupt, unqualified and unrepresentative MPs. It is high time that it be scrapped, and now it is essential to better represent women and Christians.

Estimates of the ratio of Christians in Egypt range widely between 5-20 percent, with the best estimates at around 10 percent. It would serve the national interest to set a minimum 1/8 of parliament seats to Christian MPs, and likewise for women MPs, while unequivocally affirming the two groups’ full rights to run for the highest political offices, including PM and president. Twenty women, 20 Christian and 120 free-category MPs would make a promising start, and additionally, women and Christians would also be allowed to compete in the free-category quota. These quotas would be subject to revision, and if and when women and Christians serve visibly and capably as MPs, they would fully earn the wholehearted, country-wide respect, trust and recognition as equals and partners that they already deserve, and in time, would eventually not need special quotas.

Parties would then win parliamentary seats according to their share of the national vote; a national, party-list proportional representation (PR) system. A minimum threshold: 5 percent of the national vote total, would be needed for the minimum representation in parliament by one woman, one Christian and six free-category MPs. The 5 percent threshold, as in Germany, would curb excessive parliament fragmentation, produce more stable governments and help weed out fringe or extremist parties. Parties not filling their quotas for women and Christian candidates would forgo seats, which would be divided among the other, seat-winning parties. This rule is important, as it would induce parties to accept and embrace diversity, more openness and tolerance.

The main advantages of Egypt’s new PR system would be its well-distributed party seats won, the clear, mandatory, declared, national platforms of all parties, the fair representation of women and Christians, and the curbing of lopsided, unrepresentative, landslide, large-party wins, as happened in Egypt’s 2011 elections under the mostly single-winner constituency system. That outcome duly fostered the Muslim Brotherhood’s dismissive mindset, and their aggressive and divisive power overreach during their rule of 2012-13.

Moreover, each voter would cast just one vote for his/her preferred party, with no need for runoff votes or elections held over 2-3 stages. Finally, the two main drawbacks of the PR system can be countered. Firstly, national party seats won would be allocated across the provinces and districts, mirroring their populations, voting results and demographics, thus making MPs loyal and accountable to both national and local voters, who would feel properly represented. All by-elections would be held at the local district level. And secondly, each party list of candidates, and their seniority within the lists, would be pre-determined by mandatory, transparent and binding pre-election primary votes in all parties, each being open to all its registered party members. This would increase party transparency and internal democracy, and make election candidates more answerable to voters, rather than to domineering party bosses or power brokers.

Governing Effectively

Good governance requires stability and broad-based support. Good use can be made of super-majority rules to avoid ideological, back-and-forth policy swings and decisions, such as the repeated nationalization and de-nationalization of key industries and utility firms in post-World War 2 Britain. Parliamentary bills would need a simple (over 50 percent) majority vote, and the president must sign the bill. (S)he can veto it, but a 2/3 majority vote would override the veto, inducing both sides to make prudent, well-supported judgment calls.

A stable parliamentary system must curb the incidence of shaky coalition governments and frequent early elections. The political maneuvering and calculations can be complex, but unseating and replacing governments must not be easy. A government must have parliament’s confidence. A PM can call, and must win, an over 50 percent confidence vote. Should the government fail at this, it may opt to continue as a minority government, or claim the lack of a mandate to govern and ask the president to call early elections for the following June. Otherwise the PM cannot request, nor can the president call, early elections at will.

A minority government would face the ever-present risk of a no-confidence vote called by the opposition. A 60 percent vote of no-confidence would topple the sitting government. The president would then invite the opposition to form a replacement government, requiring a 60 percent confidence vote, to serve out the rest of the four-year parliamentary term.

Should the opposition decline or fail to do so, then the president would be required to call early elections for the following June. It is worth noting that a sitting PM would face multiple challenges, from within and outside his/her own party. Even if his/her position may seem impregnable, it is perfectly feasible to put in place procedures to unseat the PM and government in case of proven violation of the law or constitution, abuse of power, corruption or clear harm to the national interest. Further penalties might also be needed in case of serious violations.

Reforming Provincial Governance

Provincial governance in Egypt needs significant change. Under current law, the president directly appoints and removes the governors at will, with no parliamentary oversight or assessment of these decisions, or fixed or known terms for the governors. Governors are usually from another province, and may be insufficiently informed about or ready to govern, their assigned province. Governors also answer only to the president.

These are important executive appointments, and require good qualifications, oversight and consensus. Democracy would be well-served by a three-stage reform process. In Reform Stage 1, the PM would nominate a governor, subject to a 60 percent approval vote by parliament. Governors would be strictly non-partisan like the president, and serve a maximum of two, four-year terms, and stability and accountability need to be balanced. When a governor’s first term expires, the PM can ask parliament to renew his/her mandate by a simple majority vote or replace him/her by a 60 percent vote, while the impeaching and unseating of a governor during his/her term would require two separate, 2/3 majority votes.

The best choices for governors would be civilian technocrats with the educational background and professional experience best-suited to grasping and managing the province’s priority issues, resources and economy. Potential military threats in border provinces should cause no concern when selecting civilian governors, as border defense duties and army troop control are handled perfectly well through the clear and well-established command chain of Egypt’s efficient and well-trained army.

Egypt needs to be readied for Stages 2 and 3, at the end of which governors native to their provinces would eventually be elected by popular vote, and answer to strong, popularly elected, independent provincial parliaments. Well-designed and implemented decentralization of provincial planning, decision making and resource allocation is a must. Residual national government and parliament oversight, and protection of provincial citizens’ rights, may be needed in Stage 2, before finally moving to a full, province-level democracy in Stage 3.

To streamline the national electoral process and avoid overburdening Egypt’s citizens with frequent elections, in a pre-determined year, voters could elect their (four year-term) national and provincial parliaments together. Two years later, voters would elect their (also for four year-term) national president and governors, and so on.

[quote]In a nascent democracy, such as that hoped for in Egypt, just, efficient and well-conceived safeguards are all-important, and if Egypt successfully navigates the tricky first few years, and experiences healthy and equitable economic growth, then the country would be on its way to start fulfilling its potential as a leader for much-needed peace, democracy and modernization in the Arab region.[/quote]

By Tarek Shafey

Tarek Shafey is a business and policy analyst with over 20 years of experience, formerly at the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Kuwait, and The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.

Get more special features in your inbox: Subscribe to our newsletter for alerts and daily updates.

Do you have a strong opinion on this article or on the economy? We want to hear from you! Tell us what you think by commenting below, or contribute your own op-ed piece at [email protected]

About Tarek Shafey PRO INVESTOR

Business and policy analyst. formerly at the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Kuwait, and The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.

View all posts by Tarek Shafey