The New “Great Game” in Central Asia

 

8 February 2011.

Central Asia is one of the eternal hot spots in world history,

a place where Darius I and Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane left their marks.

The British and Russian colonial powers followed suit when they embarked on the “Great Game,”

a bitter struggle over natural resources and strategic bases.

 

8 February 2011.

Central Asia is one of the eternal hot spots in world history,

a place where Darius I and Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane left their marks.

The British and Russian colonial powers followed suit when they embarked on the “Great Game,”

a bitter struggle over natural resources and strategic bases.

The Great Game was adjourned at the beginning of the 20th century.

But after 1920 an even more brutal dictator, Josef Stalin, put his stamp on the region when he redrew the borders of Central Asia.

Stalin created five Soviet republics, carving up traditional trading zones, and settled areas in the process.

His goal was to weaken and sow discord among the region’s Muslim ethnic groups and thus make them less of a threat to Moscow.

The seeds of ethnic strife had been sown.

They began to sprout when the vast Soviet realm was dissolved and its republics became independent nations, separated by unnatural borders.

Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski once referred to Central Asia,

a hotbed of conflict and, in Brzezinski’s view, one of the most strategically important parts of the world,

as the “Eurasian Balkans”, according to Spiegel On-Line.

Today the major powers’ interests in the region range from military bases for waging the war against the Taliban to oil and gas pipelines and drug prevention.

One of the most important heroin smuggling routes passes through a part of Central Asia controlled by Islamists.

For these reasons, the world is now witnessing a new version of the Great Game,

this time involving both the former players, Russia and Great Britain,

and new players, the United States, China and Iran.

• None of the countries within their field of vision is stable,
• eccentric dictators are in control almost everywhere,
• corruption is rampant
• and many nations are at odds with their neighbors.

After several coups and ethnic unrest, Kyrgyzstan is leaderless.

Kazakhstan, rich in natural resources, feels pressured by China.

Islamists in Tajikistan have renewed their fight against the regime,

and in Uzbekistan, a major cotton exporter, the opposition is brutally persecuted.

It’s in the context of this neighborhood that the state of Turkmenistan has emerged as a key player in both economic and strategic terms.

It is led by politician with the round cheeks and unpronounceable name,

who is hailed as the greatest son of his country, of Central Asia and perhaps even the entire world —

at least if one is to believe a book published last May, “The Grandson Fulfills the Grandfather’s Dream.”

Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, 53, has been president of Turkmenistan since December 2006.

His capital is called Ashgabat, or “City of Love.”

But there is nothing lovely or graceful about the buildings that make up the city’s skyline,

from tasteless apartment towers to cold glass palaces, and from the gleaming white parliament to gilded monuments.

Turkmenistan’s capital combines the bland grayness of Soviet architecture with the hideousness of Western wannabe avant-garde, an ostentatious past with a gaudy present.

It is a fitting combination for the capital of a country that often looks like a Stalinist Disneyland and is led by a supposedly infallible president.

Berdymukhammedov is actually an improvement.

He has toned down the cult of personality nurtured by his predecessor, Saparmurat Niyazov, the country’s first president,

a Soviet-era ruler who called himself “Turkmenbashi,” or “Father of all Turkmen.”

The current president keeps a slightly lower profile, as evidenced by the smaller number of posters showing his likeness.

Still, Turkmenistan is in the lower half of the United Nations Human Development Index,

and ranks 171st out of 183 nations on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. 

And it is ironic that Berdymukhammedov, a dentist and former health minister, heads a country

whose healthcare system the organization Doctors Without Borders holds in such low regard.

Amnesty International is critical of Turkmenistan for its persecution of members of the political opposition.

Not surprisingly, many find Ashgabat and its authoritarian leadership disconcerting.

But anyone who concludes that Turkmenistan, larger than Germany by a third,

but with a population of barely more than 5 million,

is a banana republic and thus of no interest to Europe is mistaken.

Berdymukhammedov’s bizarre realm is floating on a bubble of natural gas.

Turkmenistan is estimated to have the world’s fourth-largest reserves

and is one of the top exporters of the precious natural resource.

Turkmenistan, the least populous of the five nations that emerged from the former USSR

between the Caspian Sea and the Pamir Mountains 

is a perfect example of why Central Asia will play an increasingly important role in world politics.

With new pipelines planned for Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,

the region will be critical to the future energy supply of Europe, as well as to China and India.

The West is also determined to stem the flow of drugs to Europe via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,

as well as to put a stop to a wave of Islamist terror coming from Central Asia.

In a modern-day version of the “Great Game” of the 19th century,

today’s major powers are competing for strategic interests and military bases along the old Silk Road.

Despite the lack of unity among the rulers of the five Central Asian countries,

who are at loggerheads over borders and the use of water rights,

their forms of government are similar.

They believe that the only way to stay in power is to rule with a heavy hand.

This explains why a bizarre, irrational cult of personality in Central Asia does not contradict a policy that cleverly plays off the major powers against one another.

President Berdymukhammedov is a case in point.

He claims to be neutral and open to offers from all sides, while taking advantage of his opportunities to engage in highly lucrative deals.

China has reached an agreement with Ashgabat under which Turkmenistan will supply Beijing

with up to 40 billion cubic meters of gas in four years.

A declaration of intent for the construction of a giant pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India was signed last year,

although the plan will remain utopian unless the political situation in the region settles down.

And behind it all looms the specter of the potentially world-energy-game-changing Nabucco pipeline.

The goal is to reduce Western Europe’s energy dependency on Russia.

Construction of the 3,300-kilometer (2,050-mile) pipeline is slated to begin in 2012, at an estimated cost of €7.9 billion ($11.2 billion).

The consortium behind the project, which is to supply natural gas to Germany and other countries,

includes the German utility RWE, which holds a 16 percent stake,

and counts former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer among its consultants.

A group of European partners launched Nabucco in 2002.

The name is taken from the Verdi opera of the same name, which the partners attended to celebrate their first meeting in Vienna.

The pipeline will run from Erzurum in Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, ending at Baumgarten in Austria.

The plans call for other pipelines to be connected to the Nabucco pipeline in Turkey,

bringing gas from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and eventually from Iraq and even Iran.

However, the massive project only makes sense if there is enough natural gas available.

Azerbaijan is expected to be one of the two main suppliers,

with an initial projected annual delivery of 8 billion cubic meters,

while Turkmenistan is to deliver 10 billion cubic meters.

But can Ashgabat deliver, is it willing to deliver, and at what price will it deliver?

For months, a high-stakes game of “pipeline poker” has been played on the global stage,

one that has triggered growing nervousness among the Western players.

The key player is Berdymukhammedov.

At a summit of Turkish-speaking countries in Istanbul last fall,

Berdymukhammedov made it clear, once again, that he was highly interested in the project.

He pointed out that once the South Yolatan and Yashlar fields have been developed,

Turkmenistan will be producing enough gas to fill the pipelines to China and Western Europe,

although energy experts say this is a highly debatable claim.

But nothing has been signed yet.

“We hope to achieve clarity regarding the gas deliveries for Nabucco by the end of this year,” says an RWE spokesman.

It can’t be ruled out that Berdymukhammedov will auction off his country’s resources to the highest bidder,

which could leave Nabucco largely high and dry.

This prospect and other factors means that the pipeline could turn into a failed venture:

For political reasons, it is unrealistic to expect Iran to become a supplier in the near future,

and even the deliveries from Azerbaijan are not a sure thing,

because Iran has a 10-percent stake in the largest fields, near Baku in the Caspian Sea.

And that’s not the only structural uncertainty in this dynamic — if not unstable — region:

The US and Russia are cheek by jowl in Kyrgyzstan.

Both have military bases there, the Americans in Bishkek and the Russians nearby.

Moscow also has 6,000 men stationed at a base in Tajikistan, which they also fly to from Bishkek.

Since Washington declared Afghanistan to be the main theater of its war against terror,

military and intelligence officials from the world’s key powers have descended on Central Asia.

While the West shifts its emphasis more and more toward the northern route through Central Asia to supply its troops in Afghanistan, due to unsafe conditions in Pakistan,

other countries are beginning to think about what will happen after NATO withdraws from Afghanistan and the cards are reshuffled in the region.

The Russians, in particular, are trying to gain a foothold in Central Asia once again,

but so are the Turks, Iranians, Indians and Chinese.

They are paying special attention to Tajikistan, Afghanistan’s immediate neighbor.

The smallest country in Central Asia has a population of only 7 million people,

who speak a form of Persian and who are, for the most part, Sunni Muslims.

They too are ruled by an autocrat: 58-year-old Emomali Rakhmon,

who was once an electrician in a meat factory, then served as a sailor in the Soviet Pacific fleet and was finally the director of a collective farm.

Rakhmon, who faces a strong Islamic opposition, is a master of the regional political game.

He was closely aligned with the Russians for a long time,

but then — to Moscow’s irritation — he set off in a different direction.

He is trying to develop stronger ties to the West, partly for financial reasons.

A French military unit has 240 men stationed at the airport in Dushanbe, which they maintain as a hub for flights to Kabul.

The United States is building a training center for the Tajik army and has financed a new border bridge to Afghanistan.

Even India is involved in Tajikistan, where it is modernizing the former Soviet air base at Ajni west of Dushanbe.

Observers believe that New Delhi is seeking to establish its first foreign base there, as a counterweight to arch-enemy Pakistan.

But the most influential players in Tajikistan are Iran and China,

and they are already making plans for years from now.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad makes frequent trips to Dushanbe.

In light of the international sanctions against his country, he is seeking new allies.

He has found them in Central Asia, where he is currently assembling a union of Persian-speaking countries,

which is to include Iran, Tajikistan and the northern part of Afghanistan, which has a large Tajik population.

For Ahmadinejad, Iran and Tajikistan represent “one spirit in two bodies,”

and he has called upon Tajik President Rakhmon and Afghan President Hamid Karzai to close ranks against NATO in Asia.

His overtures have been just as successful with Karzai,

who is also seeking new allies for the period following the West’s withdrawal from Afghanistan,

as with Rakhmon, who will eventually have to keep his regime afloat without Russian or American support.

There are already 15 Iranian-Tajik joint ventures.

The Iranians helped build a large tunnel at the Anzob Pass,

which is to become a conduit for a “new Silk Road” from Tehran to China via Afghanistan.

They are also planning to build a railway and overhead power lines in the region.

The Chinese are investing even more avidly in Tajikistan.

Beijing, Dushanbe’s second-largest trading partner,

is building roads and bridges and, like the Iranians, a hydroelectric power plant.

Indeed, China could turn out to be the real winner of the new Great Game.

Beijing is not suspected of religious agitation in the region, like the Shiite Iranians,

or of playing military and political power games, like the Russians.

The Chinese want only one thing: to engage in trade and secure resources.

The Chinese already have a leg up with the region’s autocratic leaders.

Beijing shares the Central Asian elites’ mistrust of political Islam.

And China can only maintain control over its Wild West —

with the restless majority Muslim Xinjiang Province,

and its aspirations for a trans-border Greater Turkestan —

in coordination with its Central Asian neighbors.

This is why Beijing helped establish an alliance that provides it with substantial influence,

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has the potential to become a very powerful club.

SCO was founded in Shanghai in 2001.

It includes China, Russia and all Central Asia nations as members,

except Turkmenistan, which is a “guest”,

and Iran, India, Pakistan and Mongolia as observers.

Afghanistan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also represented at SCO conferences.

The combined landmass of the club’s members and observer nations makes up more than a quarter of the Earth,

while they represent more than half of the world’s population.

The secretariat is in Beijing.

Even more, China seems to be the only nation with a genuine and practical vision for Central Asia:

a “new Silk Road” consisting of pipelines, new highways from the heart of the continent to the Chinese coast,

and new railway connections from Beijing to Tashkent and on to Berlin and Paris,

a project we have already discussed in several contexts.

The development of the region is comparable to the development of

America’s Last Frontier by the Union Pacific Railroad,

as it cut straight across the North American continent:

The great pitch in the Great Game.

Despite their strategic location and economic potential,

it sometimes it seems as if the Central Asians not only have the least power to shape their own future,

but are also their own biggest obstacles.

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are still at odds over land and water in the divided Fergana Valley.

Disputes are also constantly flaring up between Tajiks and Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs.

So far, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev is the region’s only leader who has tried to unite contentious neighbors.

He has dreams of forming a Central Asian union.

During a visit by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev last year,

Nazarbayev brought up a mammoth project from the Soviet days,

according to this fascinating report from Spiegel On-Line.

It involved diverting large Siberian rivers to Kazakhstan, which, as Nazarbayev pointed out,

would dramatically improve “the water supply for the entire Central Asian region,”

an issue that, as in the Middle East, is both politically explosive and economically crucial.

And while it’s unlikely to happen anytime soon, if it ever does,

it would only increase the already high stakes of the 21st century version of Central Asia’s Great Game.

 

David Caploe PhD

Editor-in-Chief

EconomyWatch.com

President / acalaha.com