Korea Crisis Key: Refugees from the North

29 November 2010. By David Caploe PhD, Chief Political Economist, EconomyWatch.com

Almost all public discussion of the Korean situation has focused on immediate actions and re-actions,

without a clear understanding of the deep factors at play for the main actors —

North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and the US — in the on-going tit-for-tat.

While there are several of these, in our view, the most important is the fear in China and South Korea that —

29 November 2010. By David Caploe PhD, Chief Political Economist, EconomyWatch.com

Almost all public discussion of the Korean situation has focused on immediate actions and re-actions,

without a clear understanding of the deep factors at play for the main actors —

North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and the US — in the on-going tit-for-tat.

While there are several of these, in our view, the most important is the fear in China and South Korea that —

if pushed too far — North Korea is going to collapse as an independent state,

thereby unleashing a flood of refugees that they — not Japan, and not the US —

would have to deal with as an immediate and multi-dimensional problem:

economic, above all, but also social / political / and, potentially, strategic as well.

In this sense, North Korea is playing a game with the South / China / Japan / US that might be called “chicken blackmail”:

You better let us do what we want — or give us something else so we won’t do it — or we could very well go down the tubes,

and then at least SOME of you will be faced with a huge set of potentially unmanageable problems.

That is, North Korea is indeed engaging in a game of blackmail with the other actors in this drama,

but it is not particularly “nuclear” — except in the eyes of the Japanese, who have a not-unrealistic concern in this area.

Rather, it’s about the North Korean elite preserving two things:

their internal power; and even more importantly, the continued existence of the country as an independent state,

within which they can exercise that power, despite its evident and massive internal problems.

It is this potential for the dissolution of North Korea as a state —

and an ensuing flood of desperate refugees —

that lies at the heart of the different reactions to WHATEVER North Korea does

between South Korea and China, on the one hand, and, on the other, Japan and the US.

For South Korea and China, the single most important goal is to make sure

North Korea does not SUDDENLY AND CHAOTICALLY fall apart.

Neither of them would particularly mind the disappearance of North Korea (officially called the DPRK or Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) —

which is obviously a thorn in the side for both of them —

AS LONG AS IT OCCURS IN A SLOW / ORGANIZED / METHODICAL FASHION.

If it happens in this way, then there is at least a chance it won’t augur a major crisis for THEM.

But if it should unfold the way the collapse of the Soviet bloc in general, and East Germany in particular, did —

with masses of people suddenly streaming across previously hotly-contested international borders —

then the spectre of a flood of desperate refugees is a nightmare they want to avoid at almost any costs.

In this context, the German case is one both China and South Korea have looked at with some concern, especially economically.

Before 1989, West Germany was an economic powerhouse, far stronger in relative terms than even now —

and don’t forget how dependent its current prosperity is on exports to a rapidly transforming Chinese economy.

But despite its good situation at the moment, all Germans —

as well as anyone who has studied the dynamics of post-Wall economic development —

know perfectly well it has NOT been a prosperous joy-ride in the two decades since then,

but, rather, a long, hard slog to “re-balance” the German economy

in the aftermath of the West’s “absorption” of the East in 1990.

This history is especially relevant for South Korea, although it’s meaningful for China as well.

From their perspective, the ideal scenario would be that proposed for Germany

by, among others, Nobel Prize-winning / Hitler Youth author Gunther Grass:

Obviously, a change of regime in the North,

BUT with the maintenance of two independent, albeit interconnected, states

that would SLOWLY grow together into a single — hopefully, peaceful and prosperous — entity.

Of course, that’s precisely what DIDN’T happen in Germany —

which remained peaceful, but for whom prosperity was long evanescent —

and both former West and East paid a price for what DID happen for the better part of 20 years.

Clearly, South Korea (officially called the Republic of Korea) wants to avoid the massive burden of millions of hungry / jobless North Koreans,

if only to preserve its own economic dynamism,

hoping to wait for FULL unification until the situation in the North has improved enough

so it won’t drag them down for decades, as East Germany did West.

South Korea also wants to make sure that, as it DOES structurally re-connect with the North,

the general vibe between the two countries is positive,

so they don’t have to worry about potential sabotage from die-hard North Korean “loyalists.”

The situation for China is fundamentally similar, although clearly not identical, to that of South Korea.

Obviously, China is NOT ethnically linked to North Korea,

and its economy is visibly MUCH larger than even the South Korean dynamo.

But China has historically faced problems with instability arising from migrant labor within —

a dynamic already visible in its stunning economic growth —

so the last thing it needs is for its North East to be inundated by a stream of hungry and jobless North Koreans,

among whom may well be the kind of saboteurs with which South Korea is understandably concerned.

Given the centrality for both the South and China of AVOIDING a Northern collapse,

and an ensuing wave of refugees that will certainly cause economic difficulties,

and potential security complications as well,

it becomes a little clearer why both of them are willing to put up with much more from North Korea than

a) EITHER of them would like, and b) the US and Japan,

for whom the North presents a different set of problems.

While the Japanese don’t have to worry about the economic problems arising from a flood of North Korean refugees,

they ARE legitimately concerned even the rather paltry North Korean nuclear force

COULD, if worse came to worst, be launched against their major population and industrial centers.

From their point of view, the most important aspect of the North Korean dilemma is not economic but strategic / nuclear,

which is why they tend to take a very hard line against the North’s efforts in that arena.

Now, it’s also true that they have to be wary of a chaotic North Korean collapse,

because something like that could bring about precisely the nightmare scenario they are trying to forestall.

But Japan generally takes the line it’s better to deal with the immediate challenges posed by the existing regime,

rather than wait for peaceful regime change,

and risk an increase in the nuclear / strategic capabilities of which they are understandably fearful.

As a result, they generally align themselves with the usually hard-line US position against the North,

although the American stance arises out of yet a different set of considerations.

For the US, the concern is neither economic, as for the South and China, nor strategic, as it is for Japan.

Rather, it is ideological.

While this may initially seem a less profound motive than either of the other three,

both the overall curve of US foreign policy since the end of World War II,

and the utterly bizarre dynamics that have characterized both internal and external US politics

since at least the imposition of Cheney / Bush by the US Supreme Court in December 2000,

up to and including the results of the most recent US election,

indicate how deeply US actions in general are driven by ideology.

In this context, it becomes clear why all the major players involved

have so much trouble coming up with a joint strategy for dealing with the North Korean conundrum:

given such radically different interests and orientations,

it’s not surprising a “unified” approach is so hard to realize.

And the North Koreans are more than well aware of these divergencies,

which is why THEIR strategy is built fundamentally around exploiting precisely these differences,

and making THEIR moves in the structural cracks among the South / China / Japan / US.

So until those four can come up with a way to make sure they all get what they want —

an outcome that is visibly far from assured, let alone barely begun —

it seems likely North Korea is going to continue to be able to set the agenda for North East Asia,

however weak and poor it may be within.

 

David Caploe PhD

Editor-in-Chief

EconomyWatch.com

President / acalaha.com