China’s South China Sea Strategy is not Exactly Popular

We are witnessing another round of China-bashing — this time because of its reclamation activities on islands and submerged reefs in the South China Sea. The US Department of Defense has accused China of undermining the status quo and generating instability, being out of step with international rules and norms, and ‘militarising’ these features.

We are witnessing another round of China-bashing — this time because of its reclamation activities on islands and submerged reefs in the South China Sea. The US Department of Defense has accused China of undermining the status quo and generating instability, being out of step with international rules and norms, and ‘militarising’ these features.

US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has alleged that ‘turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit’. Claimants Philippines and Vietnam have said a lot worse, the former even likening China’s actions to those of Nazi Germany prior to World War II.

This article is not a defence of China’s actions. Given China’s assertive rhetoric and actions — and its refusal to clarify and explain them — it is understandable that the US and others think that China has committed, or is about to commit, a litany of sins.

China’s actions are perceived as not commensurate with its rhetoric and previous commitments, and this generates suspicion. A deep worry is that China will use its reclaimed features to bolster its military presence and control over the Spratly area, in particular, declare, and enforce an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) there. To the US, the concern is that such ‘control’ may be used to ‘inhibit freedom of navigation’.

China claims all the features in the South China Sea. So do Vietnam and Taiwan. The Philippines and Malaysia claim some. Under the modern international legal ‘sovereignty’ standard of continuous, effective occupation, administration, and control, all these claims have weaknesses.

There are several ‘legal islands’ in the Spratlys, including Spratly and Taiwan-occupied Taiping. China does not occupy them, but it does claim them. These islands qualify for 12 nautical mile (nm) territorial seas, 200 nm exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and a continental shelf out to as far as 350 nm. China may be claiming some of the submerged features as being in its EEZ from these legal islands. This would not convey sovereignty, but it would convey a right to construct artificial structures.

Another possibility is that China is claiming that the submerged features it is building on are encompassed by the territorial sea of its claimed legal islands and come within baselines drawn around the islands, meaning they would be under its sovereignty. The problem is we do not know exactly what China claims and why.

China could have a plausible claim to some submerged features and a 12 nm territorial sea from the baselines. At the very least, ‘artificial structures’ in China’s claimed EEZ would be entitled to a safety zone of 500 metres. Presumably, the zone extends to overflight. China’s warnings to foreign military aircraft that they were approaching a ‘military alert zone’ may have been reasonable.

China presumably claims a territorial sea and the right to ban overflights from the China-occupied islands of Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Johnson South Reef. Thus, US overflight of the feature and its territorial sea could be seen as a challenge to China’s claim to sovereignty. Perhaps the US position is that sovereignty is unsettled so no sovereign is recognised. Alternatively, perhaps the US intends to challenge China’s regime of prior notification for foreign warships to enter its territorial sea. However, Vietnam has a similar regime and it should draw similar challenges. It may not be clear what the US is challenging and why, and this could easily be misinterpreted by China.

What about the charge that China is not adhering to regional norms? All claimants have reclaimed land around their occupied features, maintained them and allowed use by their militaries, and though the scope and scale of China’s reclamation exceeds that of all the other claimants combined.

Can China declare an ADIZ over the area? There are no international legal bases for such zones and their ‘rules’ — except perhaps the general principles of ‘self-defence’ and ‘freedom of overflight’. The US established the precedent of an ADIZ and its rules after World War II, and it apparently thinks that all other nations’ ADIZs should be based on its model. However, being first does not justify dictating the rules for all, especially in the absence of an international agreement.

China could declare a zone out to, say, 200–250 nm off its coast but not including any disputed islands or maritime space except the Paracels and possibly Pratas Island. That should be grudgingly accepted by most of its critics. A legitimate worry is that China’s ADIZ would contain similar rules and regulations to the one it established in the East China Sea. This includes a controversial requirement of prior notification for foreign aircraft entering the ADIZ even if they are only transiting it and not destined for China’s territorial airspace. Nevertheless, China has so far not enforced this requirement. Moreover, Japan has a similar requirement for Taiwanese aircraft entering its ADIZ, as do Australia, Myanmar, and Taiwan for foreign aircraft.

But a Chinese ADIZ that includes some disputed Spratly islands and their maritime space could be problematic. It would be a manifestation of the worst fears of the US, Japan and Southeast Asian nations that China wants to control the South China Sea, including its air corridors and sea-lanes. In their eyes, this would be tantamount to a threat to ‘freedom of navigation’ and may be a ‘red line’ for the US.

China’s actions are in principle commensurate with what others have done. So who or what is altering the status quo and ‘destabilising’ the region? Is it China’s reclamation activities or the US military rebalance and its perceived challenge to China’s political and military ambitions?

As an anonymous, US official opined about China’s reclamation activities: ‘There is no military threat. It is about the symbolism’. This statement is perhaps the most accurate of all.

New round of China-bashing over the South China Sea is republished with permission from East Asia Forum