Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to Australia in mid-March 2015 has highlighted how Australia–Vietnam relations relate to the broader strategic picture in the Asia Pacific. While much attention is paid to ‘the rise of China’, the ‘Pacific pivot’ of the United States and the concerns of major powers like Japan, India and Indonesia, regional strategic issues are also important to middle powers such as Australia and Vietnam.
On 19 December 1984, amidst great fanfare, the United Kingdom and China signed the Sino–British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong. It contained extensive guarantees of Hong Kong’s autonomy, rule of law, and fundamental rights — all of which would remain entrenched until 50 years after the transfer of sovereignty. On signing day, Deng Xiaoping confidently declared to Margaret Thatcher that ‘China will always keep its promises’.
Dame Meg Taylor is no ordinary woman. The first woman to be appointed to the position of Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum has a proud track record of breaking boundaries on behalf of Pacific women. As PNG’s first woman lawyer and the first Papua New Guinean woman to serve her country as an ambassador, she has seen immense changes in women’s roles in the Pacific during her lifetime.
Timor-Leste’s new Prime Minister, Rui Araujo, has inherited a policy of decentralising the nation’s governance. Given capacity issues, this process is unlikely to bring broader-based rural development to Timor-Leste in the short term. But, if managed effectively, greater decentralisation could have some positive impacts on village-level infrastructure and autonomy.
ASEAN would benefit from stronger leadership however, Indonesia, the country best placed to take up that role, appears unwilling. Indonesia could be the leader that ASEAN needs, but it intentionally refrains from asserting its influence over the association.
This is due to Indonesia’s internal weaknesses, ASEAN’s norms of non-interference and equality among members, and the remaining antagonism among ASEAN member countries. This situation leaves a power vacuum within the association and intensifies the academic debate about leadership in integrating regions.
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been much in news ever since China showed interest in forming a bank that focused on infrastructure projects in the Asian region. Established in 2014, the Asian lending institution has a target of $100 billion in registered capital with China having most of its initial $50bn in capital. With many European nations supporting the new bank, the US is raising concerns over the bank citing issues related to the bank’s standards of governance and environmental and social safeguards.
The United States has dominated global economics and finance in the post-war era. But the rise of new regional institutions and agreements in Asia will pose a growing and lasting competitive challenge to US leadership in the Pacific.
To adapt and compete, American strategy must reflect a clear understanding of the depths and origins of change in Asia. The US cannot compete in either geopolitics or business unless it understands the sources of its competition in the first place.
Some are calling for a new institution to manage Asia’s maritime disputes.
‘The physical contours of East Asia’, leading geopolitical analyst Robert Kaplan recently wrote, ‘argue for a naval century’. Given the significance of the maritime realm in the region — which is the source of rich energy resources and vital maritime trade routes, as well as raging territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas — few would disagree.
Japan should seriously consider joining the new China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), regardless of the scheme’s detractors within the country.
Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed the AIIB in 2013. Beijing signed up 21 founding member nations in October 2014. Expect more, detailed negotiations over the governance structure when the bank officially launches by the end of 2015.
Indonesia’s Natuna Islands could become yet another security flashpoint in the South China Sea. The islands’ proximity to the disputed areas in the South China Sea, and isolation from Jakarta, makes it one of Indonesia’s most vulnerable regions. Any effective security and military presence in the area will depend on local economic and infrastructure development. How will Indonesia under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) manage this potential point of contention with China?
