As ASEAN meetings in Vientiane concluded in September 2016, an air of anxiety was already beginning to settle over the Southeast Asian nations. Further resistance against China’s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea is proving increasingly futile.
Indonesia has consistently underperformed in the Program for International Student Assessment test — a standardised test administered by the OECD to measure the academic performance of 15 year olds.
More recently, the OECD also administered the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) tests for individuals aged 15–65. The results for Indonesia were similarly underwhelming.
Implementing Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) vague ambition to become the maritime power connecting the Pacific and India Oceans — a so-called ‘global maritime fulcrum’ (GMF) — will be an enormous challenge for Indonesia. Making matters worse, since the announcement of the GMF, there has been no detailed policy blueprint, even though efforts to realise the vision have been underway.
Without networks within the military, and having no effective power over the political parties, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) has been constrained in his political manoeuvres. To combat this, Jokowi has installed retired army generals to important civilian posts as coordinating ministers, defence minister and head of state intelligence.
The inclusion of a considerable number of former military officers in his administration has been Jokowi’s way to balance the influence of the oligarchs that supported him during his presidential campaign.
Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) victory in the 2014 presidential election was celebrated as it represented a major step forward for democracy in the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. Jokowi’s rise to power was unprecedented.
It was largely the collective effort of volunteers and a strong social media presence, which helped overcome his humble persona and highlight credible achievements during his term as mayor of Solo and Governor of Jakarta. This inspired high expectations that he would be able to enact much-needed political and economic reforms as president.
Once again, President Joko Widodo has reshuffled his cabinet. One pleasant surprise is the return of Sri Mulyani Indrawati, who until recently was Managing Director and Chief Operating Officer of the World Bank. She accepted the offer to serve as the Minister of Finance, replacing Bambang Brodjonegoro who now leads the Ministry of Planning.
In July, Indonesian President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo courted controversy by appointing a former New Order general who has been accused of human rights abuses, Wiranto, as Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs. As security and human rights have come to dominate the political dynamic in West Papua, the new appointment to the third most powerful position in Indonesia’s Cabinet raises new questions for Indonesia’s restive eastern province.
Compared with its Asian near neighbours, Indonesia has long been tolerant of same-sex sexuality and transgenderism. Unlike Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia never criminalised homosexuality and has been accommodating of transgender people.
Religious identity and gender relations are integral to women’s experiences of citizenship in Indonesia. While around 88 percent of Indonesia’s population is Muslim, it is emphatically not an Islamic state, in which state law and Islamic law are coterminous. So what is the relationship of religion to citizenship rights for women in the Muslim majority?
The Indonesian government recently announced it would start to regulate app-based ride-sharing services such as Uber and Grab Taxi. This followed a large strike by taxi drivers in Jakarta to protest against the ride-sharing companies.
