As the Communist Party of Vietnam prepared for its five-year national congress, suspense built over who would take over the party’s helm. When the curtain was finally lifted on 25 January 2016, supporters of populist Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung were disappointed to find that conservative incumbent Nguyen Phu Trong had won a second term.
The day after the 12th national Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), the Bank of Investment and Development of Vietnam announced the suspension of its two governing board members. The men allegedly committed ‘wrongdoings in management’, a term usually used by the authorities for offences associated with corruption. It is hard to know the exact reason this case was made public, particularly given recent rumours of political infighting within the CPV.
While Vietnam’s 12th Party Congress was billed as a contest for leadership of the party between sitting party secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and sitting Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, it might well be remembered as marking the beginning of a generational shift in the party’s top leadership. Yet a generational shift does not necessarily entail major changes. Indeed, for all the excitement and tension that surrounded the congress, the current mood in Vietnam is one of anti-climax.
In architecture, there is a dictum that ‘form follows function’. The architect decides a building’s use and then designs the building for those purposes. In Vietnam’s process of economic reforms, the reverse is often the case — ‘function follows form’. Structures are put in place and then it is hoped that the functionality will follow. This appears to be the case in reforms to the country’s banking sector.
Vietnam’s economy grew at its fastest pace in five years due to such factors as record foreign investment and strong domestic demand, according to AFP. The government recorded 6.68 percent expansion for the year, surpassing expectations of 6.2 percent. The World Bank also predicts that the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) could add up to 8 percent to Vietnam’s GDP over the next 20 years.
Every five years, Vietnamese dare to hope that this time, the ruling Communist Party will take a chance on change.
Four successive party congresses have just kicked the ball down the road. They have redistributed positions mainly with a view to preserving factional balance. The leadership has been left deadlocked on core issues: Vietnam’s stance toward China and other powers, the state’s role in the economy and whether Party actions should be subject to review by independent judges.
The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is preparing a new slate of leaders to replace the old guard who are retiring at the 12th National Congress in 2016. Public attention has been drawn to the rise of young ‘princelings’ — the children of current or former leaders in communist authoritarian regimes like Vietnam and China — to local executive positions and bodies.
The ability of these princelings to deliver on a broad range of governance issues, beyond just high levels of economic growth, will determine the durability of the current regime.
Under President Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is using the Seven Prohibitions to shut down discussion about liberal constitutional reform. In comparison, constitutional deliberations in Vietnam appear open, vibrant and far-reaching — prompting some commentators to speculate on whether Vietnam is a model for post-socialist institutional reform. However, do all types of constitutional discourse translate into institutional reform or are some types of discourse more potent than others?
In September 2015, the National Wage Council (NWC) of Vietnam proposed an increase of 12.4 percent to the minimum wage in 2016. The key parties — representatives of business in the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) and the state-sanctioned national union of workers, the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) — finally reached a consensus after two stalled meetings. The process, after all, is within the state’s annual schedule and hardly goes with any substantive changes to labour market institutions.
According to the latest data, Vietnam’s economy received a boost from lower energy costs and increased foreign investment. The nation’s central bank is also well situated in commencing more easing strategies in the event of an economic downturn. Vietnam’s central bank devalued the dong, increasing exports and foreign investment.
