South Asia is one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. At 5 percent, trade shares among South Asian neighbours are lower than trade shares among Sub-Saharan African economies. This is largely because the region’s two biggest players — India and Pakistan — do not have normalised economic relations.
While attention has focused on India’s strained ties with its neighbours, some notable strides have been made in the bilateral relationship with Bangladesh. Progress on the political front has captured the spotlight, with the recent Land Boundary Agreement. However, both sides have also made significant progress in developing their economic ties and connectivity.
On 11 February, the South Korean government abruptly shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), a joint inter-Korean industrial zone located just 10 kilometres north of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), as a punishment for North Korea’s recent nuclear test and rocket launch. The closure left more than 52,000 North Korean workers unemployed and more than 120 small- and medium-sized South Korean companies with nowhere to do business.
Since the end of the 2000s, a new era for regional cooperation has been unfolding in Asia. China’s ascent as a regional leader, the advent of mega FTAs and the changing presence of India have driven this change. However, what does this new environment mean for Japan, and how will it shape the future of the region?
Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper says a lot about the South China Sea, both directly and indirectly. It expresses concern about land reclamation and construction activities by claimants in the sea and about the possible use of artificial structures for military purpose. It also makes much of the importance of a rules-based global order to Australia’s security, with a clear message that some countries are not following these rules.
North Korea’s relations with the wider world have taken a tangible turn for the worse. Pyongyang’s double whammy of a nuclear test on 6 January 2016 followed by a satellite launch on 7 February 2016 was arguably nothing new. The Kim regime has conducted both kinds of tests regularly for a decade, each time condemned and sanctioned by the UN Security Council (UNSC). There was no reason to hope Kim Jong-un was about to change his spots.
Earlier this month, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop visited Tokyo, where she outlined an increasing emphasis on security cooperation between Japan and Australia. The next day she was in Beijing, where she reportedly received a frosty reception. The two are not unrelated — Beijing is not thrilled about Australia’s growing security ties with Japan.
Following its landmark agreement with the international community regarding halting its nuclear weapons development programs, Iran has exploded onto the world stage. In what is the most recent in a series of new economic treaties and alliances, Iran and Singapore have signed an investment treaty designed to support Singapore companies that seek to invest in a market that, until recently, was embargoed from the outside world.
The topic of China dominates almost every economic and foreign policy discussion in India. Yet the concept of a rising India is still a foreign concept in the circles of Chinese elites. Many Chinese are often surprised or amused by the enthusiasm of analysts in comparing China and India. In the eyes of many Chinese the only similarities are that both countries are in Asia and have a population of over a billion people.
As the European Union grew, the unanimity in decision-making increasingly gave way to qualified majority voting. This development took away an important weapon the UK deployed to pursue its national interest. The use often frustrates the collectivist decision-making in Brussels and exerts its will for a broad union that preserved national sovereignty.
