Nouriel Roubini – Economy Watch

Alibaba set to price IPO shares amid surging investor demand

Nouriel Roubini — Thu, 18 Sep 2014 05:56:58 +0000

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Alibaba Group Holding the chinese e-commerce giant will sell $22 billion of shares on Thursday, finalizing a two week road show that pulled interest from world-wide investors and will likely be the world’s largest initial public offering.

Alibaba shares will be priced after the markets close at 4pm. Thursday and will trade on the New York Stock Exchange on Friday with the ticker “BABA.”

Investors looking to invest into China’s growing middle class & evolving internet market, have been chomping at the bit to get shares since top executive at Alibaba, including executive chairman Jack Ma, started the road show last week.

Alibaba handles more transactions than Amazon.com Inc and eBay Inc combined, the IPO price range has increased to between $66 and $68 a share due to the o

At the top end of that range, the IPO would raise almost $22 billion, however if underwriters decide to sell more shares, Alibaba’s market debut could out pace Agricultural Bank of China Ltd’s record $22.1 billion IPO in 2010.

Ma founded Alibaba in his apartment and has come to power four-fifths of all online commerce conducted in China, the world’s second-largest economy. Alibaba now handles other businesses such as e-payments and financial investment.

Alibaba’s complex governance structure and Ma’s outside investments have raised questions about potential conflicts of interest and investors’ ability to sway Alibaba’s strategy.

Alibaba IPO finalizes a long listing process which Alibaba took the rare step of not appointing a single bank to take charge of the IPO process. Instead, Alibaba tapped all its major bookrunners for advice, and divided tasks among them.

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Is A Broader Financial Derisking Cycle At Hand?: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Mon, 01 Jul 2013 05:54:56 +0000

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The prices of a wide range of risky assets have been rising, despite sluggish GDP growth worldwide. This discrepancy reflects a new period of financial-market volatility – one that could mark the beginning of a broader de-risking cycle for financial markets.

NEW YORK – Until the recent bout of financial-market turbulence, a variety of risky assets (including equities, government bonds, and commodities) had been rallying since last summer. But, while risk aversion and volatility were falling and asset prices were rising, economic growth remained sluggish throughout the world. Now the global economy’s chickens may be coming home to roost.

Japan, struggling against two decades of stagnation and deflation, had to resort to Abenomics to avoid a quintuple-dip recession. In the United Kingdom, the debate since last summer has focused on the prospect of a triple-dip recession. Most of the eurozone remains mired in a severe recession – now spreading from the periphery to parts of the core. Even in the United States, economic performance has remained mediocre, with growth hovering around 1.5% for the last few quarters.

And now the darlings of the world economy, emerging markets, have proved unable to reverse their own slowdowns. According to the IMF, China’s annual GDP growth has slowed to 8%, from 10% in 2010; over the same period, India’s growth rate slowed from 11.2% to 5.7%. Russia, Brazil, and South Africa are growing at around 3%, and other emerging markets are slowing as well.

This gap between Wall Street and Main Street (rising asset prices, despite worse-than-expected economic performance) can be explained by three factors. First, the tail risks (low-probability, high-impact events) in the global economy – a eurozone breakup, the US going over its fiscal cliff, a hard economic landing for China, a war between Israel and Iran over nuclear proliferation – are lower now than they were a year ago.

Second, while growth has been disappointing in both developed and emerging markets, financial markets remain hopeful that better economic data will emerge in the second half of 2013 and 2014, especially in the US and Japan, with the UK and the eurozone bottoming out and most emerging markets returning to form. Optimists repeat the refrain that “this year is different”: after a prolonged period of painful deleveraging, the global economy supposedly is on the cusp of stronger growth.

Third, in response to slower growth and lower inflation (owing partly to lower commodity prices), the world’s major central banks pursued another round of unconventional monetary easing: lower policy rates, forward guidance, quantitative easing (QE), and credit easing. Likewise, many emerging-market central banks reacted to slower growth and lower inflation by cutting policy rates as well.

This massive wave of liquidity searching for yield fueled temporary asset-price reflation around the world. But there were two risks to liquidity-driven asset reflation. First, if growth did not recover and surprise on the upside (in which case high asset prices would be justified), eventually slow growth would dominate the levitational effects of liquidity and force asset prices lower, in line with weaker economic fundamentals. Second, it was possible that some central banks – namely the Fed – could pull the plug (or hose) by exiting from QE and zero policy rates.

This brings us to the recent financial-market turbulence. It was already evident in the first and second quarters of this year that growth in China and other emerging markets was slowing. This explains the underperformance of commodities and emerging-market equities even before the recent turmoil. But the Fed’s recent signals of an early exit from QE – together with stronger evidence of China’s slowdown and Chinese, Japanese, and European central bankers’ failure to provide the additional monetary easing that investors expected – dealt emerging markets an additional blow.

These countries have found themselves on the receiving end not only of a correction in commodity prices and equities, but also of a brutal re-pricing of currencies and both local- and foreign-currency fixed-income assets. Brazil and other countries that complained about “hot money” inflows and “currency wars,” have now suddenly gotten what they wished for: a likely early end of the Fed’s QE. The consequences – sharp capital-flow reversals that are now hitting all risky emerging-market assets – have not been pretty.

[quote] Whether the correction in risky assets is temporary or the start of a bear market will depend on several factors. One is whether the Fed will truly exit from QE as quickly as it signaled. There is a strong likelihood that weaker US growth and lower inflation will force it to slow the pace of its withdrawal of liquidity support. [/quote]

Another variable is how much easier monetary policies in other developed countries will become. The Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank are already easing policy as their economies’ growth lags that of the US. How much further they go may well be influenced in part by domestic conditions and in part by the extent to which weaker growth in China exacerbates downside risks in Asian economies, commodity exporters, and the US and the eurozone. A further slowdown in China and other emerging economies is another risk to financial markets.

Then there is the question of how emerging-market policymakers respond to the turbulence: Will they raise rates to stem inflationary depreciation and capital outflows, or will they cut rates to boost flagging GDP growth, thus increasing the risk of inflation and of a sudden capital-flow reversal?

Two final factors include how soon the eurozone economy bottoms out (there have been some recent signs of stabilization, but the monetary union’s chronic problems remain unresolved), and whether Middle East tensions and the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region – and responses to that threat by the US and Israel – escalate or are successfully contained.

A new period of uncertainty and volatility has begun, and it seems likely to lead to choppy economies and choppy markets. Indeed, a broader de-risking cycle for financial markets could be at hand.

By Nouriel Roubini

Copyright: Project-Syndicate, 2013

Nouriel Roubini, a.k.a. “Doctor Doom”, is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Roubini has been consistently cited as one of the world’s top global thinkers after he was able to accurately describe the current economic crisis that began in 2008, many years prior to it happening. In 2011, he was voted as the most influential economist in the world by Forbes magazine.

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Fool for Gold: Why the Precious Metal Remains a Barbarous Relic: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Mon, 03 Jun 2013 07:21:05 +0000

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Gold prices tend to spike when there are serious economic, financial and geopolitical risks. But now that the global economy is recovering, prices are expected to trend lower over time as the financial crisis mends itself. As John Maynard Keynes rightly pointed out in 1924, gold remains a “barbarous relic” with no intrinsic value, and is used mainly as a hedge against mostly irrational fear and panic.

VENICE – The run-up in gold prices in recent years – from $800 per ounce in early 2009 to above $1,900 in the fall of 2011 – had all the features of a bubble. And now, like all asset-price surges that are divorced from the fundamentals of supply and demand, the gold bubble is deflating.

At the peak, gold bugs – a combination of paranoid investors and others with a fear-based political agenda – were happily predicting gold prices going to $2,000, $3,000, and even to $5,000 in a matter of years. But prices have moved mostly downward since then. In April, gold was selling for close to $1,300 per ounce – and the price is still hovering below $1400, an almost 30% drop from the 2011 high.

There are many reasons why the bubble has burst, and why gold prices are likely to move much lower, toward $1,000 by 2015.

First, gold prices tend to spike when there are serious economic, financial, and geopolitical risks in the global economy. During the global financial crisis, even the safety of bank deposits and government bonds was in doubt for some investors. If you worry about financial Armageddon, it is indeed metaphorically the time to stock your bunker with guns, ammunition, canned food, and gold bars.

But, even in that dire scenario, gold might be a poor investment. Indeed, at the peak of the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, gold prices fell sharply a few times. In an extreme credit crunch, leveraged purchases of gold cause forced sales, because any price correction triggers margin calls. As a result, gold can be very volatile – upward and downward – at the peak of a crisis.

Related: The Gold Outlook For 2013

Second, gold performs best when there is a risk of high inflation, as its popularity as a store of value increases. But, despite very aggressive monetary policy by many central banks – successive rounds of “quantitative easing” have doubled, or even tripled, the money supply in most advanced economies – global inflation is actually low and falling further.

The reason is simple: while base money is soaring, the velocity of money has collapsed, with banks hoarding the liquidity in the form of excess reserves. Ongoing private and public debt deleveraging has kept global demand growth below that of supply.

Thus, firms have little pricing power, owing to excess capacity, while workers’ bargaining power is low, owing to high unemployment. Moreover, trade unions continue to weaken, while globalization has led to cheap production of labor-intensive goods in China and other emerging markets, depressing the wages and job prospects of unskilled workers in advanced economies.

With little wage inflation, high goods inflation is unlikely. If anything, inflation is now falling further globally as commodity prices adjust downward in response to weak global growth. And gold is following the fall in actual and expected inflation.

[quote] Third, unlike other assets, gold does not provide any income. Whereas equities have dividends, bonds have coupons, and homes provide rents, gold is solely a play on capital appreciation. Now that the global economy is recovering, other assets – equities or even revived real estate – thus provide higher returns. Indeed, US and global equities have vastly outperformed gold since the sharp rise in gold prices in early 2009. [/quote]

Fourth, gold prices rose sharply when real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates became increasingly negative after successive rounds of quantitative easing. The time to buy gold is when the real returns on cash and bonds are negative and falling. But the more positive outlook about the US and the global economy implies that over time the Federal Reserve and other central banks will exit from quantitative easing and zero policy rates, which means that real rates will rise, rather than fall.

Fifth, some argued that highly indebted sovereigns would push investors into gold as government bonds became more risky. But the opposite is happening now. Many of these highly indebted governments have large stocks of gold, which they may decide to dump to reduce their debts. Indeed, a report that Cyprus might sell a small fraction – some €400 million ($520 million) – of its gold reserves triggered a 13% fall in gold prices in April. Countries like Italy, which has massive gold reserves (above $130 billion), could be similarly tempted, driving down prices further.

Sixth, some extreme political conservatives, especially in the United States, hyped gold in ways that ended up being counterproductive. For this far-right fringe, gold is the only hedge against the risk posed by the government’s conspiracy to expropriate private wealth. These fanatics also believe that a return to the gold standard is inevitable as hyperinflation ensues from central banks’ “debasement” of paper money. But, given the absence of any conspiracy, falling inflation, and the inability to use gold as a currency, such arguments cannot be sustained.

A currency serves three functions, providing a means of payment, a unit of account, and a store of value. Gold may be a store of value for wealth, but it is not a means of payment; you cannot pay for your groceries with it. Nor is it a unit of account; prices of goods and services, and of financial assets, are not denominated in gold terms.

[quote] So gold remains John Maynard Keynes’s “barbarous relic,” with no intrinsic value and used mainly as a hedge against mostly irrational fear and panic. Yes, all investors should have a very modest share of gold in their portfolios as a hedge against extreme tail risks. But other real assets can provide a similar hedge, and those tail risks – while not eliminated – are certainly lower today than at the peak of the global financial crisis. [/quote]

While gold prices may temporarily move higher in the next few years, they will be very volatile and will trend lower over time as the global economy mends itself. The gold rush is over.

By Nouriel Roubini

Copyright: Project-Syndicate, 2013

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A Huge Fed-Induced Credit Bubble By 2017?: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Tue, 30 Apr 2013 07:53:39 +0000

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Since injecting more than $2 trillion into the financial system through three rounds of quantitative easing, the U.S. Federal Reserve is gradually realising that their experiment to kick-start the economy with near-zero interest rates has failed. Contemplating an exit strategy however may prove to be far more difficult; as loose monetary policy over the last five years has boosted leverage and risk-taking in financial markets; increasing the risk of a credit and asset bubble as large, if not larger, than the previous one.

MUMBAI – The ongoing weakness of America’s economy – where deleveraging in the private and public sectors continues apace – has led to stubbornly high unemployment and sub-par growth. The effects of fiscal austerity – a sharp rise in taxes and a sharp fall in government spending since the beginning of the year – are undermining economic performance even more.

Indeed, recent data have effectively silenced hints by some Federal Reserve officials that the Fed should begin exiting from its current third (and indefinite) round of quantitative easing (QE3). Given slow growth, high unemployment (which has fallen only because discouraged workers are leaving the labor force), and inflation well below the Fed’s target, this is no time to start constraining liquidity.

The problem is that the Fed’s liquidity injections are not creating credit for the real economy, but rather boosting leverage and risk-taking in financial markets. The issuance of risky junk bonds under loose covenants and with excessively low interest rates is increasing; the stock market is reaching new highs, despite the growth slowdown; and money is flowing to high-yielding emerging markets.

[quote]Even the periphery of the eurozone is benefiting from the wall of liquidity unleashed by the Fed, the Bank of Japan, and other major central banks. With interest rates on government bonds in the US, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland at ridiculously low levels, investors are on a global quest for yield.[/quote]

It may be too soon to say that many risky assets have reached bubble levels, and that leverage and risk-taking in financial markets is becoming excessive. But the reality is that credit and asset/equity bubbles are likely to form in the next two years, owing to loose US monetary policy. The Fed has signaled that QE3 will continue until the labor market has improved sufficiently (likely in early 2014), with the interest rate at 0 percent until unemployment has fallen at least to 6.5 percent (most likely no earlier than the beginning of 2015).

Even when the Fed starts to raise interest rates (some time in 2015), it will proceed slowly. In the previous tightening cycle, which began in 2004, it took the Fed two years to normalize the policy rate. This time, the unemployment rate and household and government debt are much higher. Rapid normalization – like that undertaken in the space of a year in 1994 – would crash asset markets and risk leading to a hard economic landing.

But if financial markets are already frothy now, consider how frothy they will be in 2015, when the Fed starts tightening, and in 2017 (if not later), when the Fed finishes tightening? Last time, interest rates were too low for too long (2001-2004), and the subsequent rate normalization was too slow, inflating huge bubbles in credit, housing, and equity markets.

[quote]We know how that movie ended, and we may be poised for a sequel. The weak real economy and job market, together with high debt ratios, suggest the need to exit monetary stimulus slowly. But a slow exit risks creating a credit and asset bubble as large as the previous one, if not larger. Pursuing real economic stability, it seems, may lead again to financial instability.[/quote]

Some at the Fed – Chairman Ben Bernanke and Vice Chair Janet Yellen – argue that policymakers can pursue both goals: the Fed will raise interest rates slowly to provide economic stability (strong income and employment growth and low inflation) while preventing financial instability (credit and asset bubbles stemming from high liquidity and low interest rates) by using macro-prudential supervision and regulation of the financial system. In other words, the Fed will use regulatory instruments to control credit growth, risk-taking, and leverage.

But another Fed faction – led by Governors Jeremy Stein and Daniel Tarullo – argues that macro-prudential tools are untested, and that limiting leverage in one part of the financial market simply drives liquidity elsewhere. Indeed, the Fed regulates only banks, so liquidity and leverage will migrate to the shadow banking system if banks are regulated more tightly. As a result, only the Fed’s interest-rate instrument, Stein and Tarullo argue, can get into all of the financial system’s cracks.

But if the Fed has only one effective instrument – interest rates – its two goals of economic and financial stability cannot be pursued simultaneously. Either the Fed pursues the first goal by keeping rates low for longer and normalizing them very slowly, in which case a huge credit and asset bubble would emerge in due course; or the Fed focuses on preventing financial instability and increases the policy rate much faster than weak growth and high unemployment would otherwise warrant, thereby halting an already-sluggish recovery.

[quote]The exit from the Fed’s QE and zero-interest-rate policies will be treacherous: Exiting too fast will crash the real economy, while exiting too slowly will first create a huge bubble and then crash the financial system. If the exit cannot be navigated successfully, a dovish Fed is more likely to blow bubbles.[/quote]

By Nouriel Roubini

Copyright: Project-Syndicate, 2013

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Assessing The Global Economy’s Myriad Of Challenges: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Tue, 02 Apr 2013 08:11:27 +0000

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Following the 2008 financial crisis, it is almost inconceivable to think that America today represents the greatest hope for the global economy. Yet, with Europe struggling to restore growth, China facing a hard landing if critical structural reforms are postponed, and emerging markets turning more and more towards state capitalism, the U.S. is in the best relative shape among the world’s largest economies – even if this fact in itself presents risks.

ISTANBUL – In the last four weeks, I have traveled to Sofia, Kuala Lumpur, Dubai, London, Milan, Frankfurt, Berlin, Paris, Beijing, Tokyo, Istanbul, and throughout the United States. As a result, the myriad challenges facing the global economy were never far away.

Europe’s Woes

In Europe, the tail risk of a eurozone break-up and a loss of market access by Spain and Italy were reduced by last summer’s decision by the European Central Bank to backstop sovereign debt. But the monetary union’s fundamental problems – low potential growth, ongoing recession, loss of competitiveness, and large stocks of private and public debt – have not been resolved.

Moreover, the grand bargain between the eurozone core, the ECB, and the periphery – painful austerity and reforms in exchange for large-scale financial support – is now breaking down, as austerity fatigue in the eurozone periphery runs up against bailout fatigue in core countries like Germany and the Netherlands.

Austerity fatigue in the periphery is clearly evident from the success of anti-establishment forces in Italy’s recent election; large street demonstrations in Spain, Portugal, and elsewhere; and now the botched bailout of Cypriot banks, which has fueled massive public anger. Throughout the periphery, populist parties of the left and right are gaining ground.

Meanwhile, Germany’s insistence on imposing losses on bank creditors in Cyprus is the latest symptom of bailout fatigue in the core. Other core eurozone members, eager to limit the risks to their taxpayers, have similarly signaled that creditor “bail-ins” are the way of the future.

Outside the eurozone, even the United Kingdom is struggling to restore growth, owing to the damage caused by front-loaded fiscal-consolidation efforts, while anti-austerity sentiment is also mounting in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary.

China’s Transition

In China, the leadership transition has occurred smoothly. But the country’s economic model remains, as former Premier Wen Jiabao famously put it, “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”

China’s problems are many: regional imbalances between its coastal regions and the interior, and between urban and rural areas; too much savings and fixed investment, and too little private consumption; growing income and wealth inequality; and massive environmental degradation, with air, water, and soil pollution jeopardizing public health and food safety.

[quote]The country’s new leaders speak earnestly of deepening reforms and rebalancing the economy, but they remain cautious, gradualist, and conservative by inclination. Moreover, the power of vested interests that oppose reform – state-owned enterprises, provincial governments, and the military, for example – has yet to be broken. As a result, the reforms needed to rebalance the economy may not occur fast enough to prevent a hard landing when, by next year, an investment bust materializes.[/quote]

In China – and in Russia (and partly in Brazil and India) – state capitalism has become more entrenched, which does not bode well for growth. Overall, these four countries (the BRICs) have been over-hyped, and other emerging economies may do better in the next decade: Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia in Asia; Chile, Colombia, and Peru in Latin America; and Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Poland in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Japan’s Experiment

Farther East, Japan is trying a new economic experiment to stop deflation, boost economic growth, and restore business and consumer confidence. “Abenomics” has several components: aggressive monetary stimulus by the Bank of Japan; a fiscal stimulus this year to jump start demand, followed by fiscal austerity in 2014 to rein in deficits and debt; a push to increase nominal wages to boost domestic demand; structural reforms to deregulate the economy; and new free-trade agreements – starting with the Trans-Pacific Partnership – to boost trade and productivity.

But the challenges are daunting. It is not clear if deflation can be beaten with monetary policy; excessive fiscal stimulus and deferred austerity may make the debt unsustainable; and the structural-reform components of Abenomics are vague. Moreover, tensions with China over territorial claims in the East China Sea may adversely affect trade and foreign direct investment.

Middle East’s Instability

Then there is the Middle East, which remains an arc of instability from the Maghreb to Pakistan. Turkey – with a young population, high potential growth, and a dynamic private sector – seeks to become a major regional power. But Turkey faces many challenges of its own. Its bid to join the European Union is currently stalled, while the eurozone recession dampens its growth. Its current-account deficit remains large, and monetary policy has been confusing, as the objective of boosting competitiveness and growth clashes with the need to control inflation and avoid excessive credit expansion.

Moreover, while rapprochement with Israel has become more likely, Turkey faces severe tensions with Syria and Iran, and its Islamist ruling party must still prove that it can coexist with the country’s secular political tradition.

Risks Remain

In this fragile global environment, has America become a beacon of hope? The U.S. is experiencing several positive economic trends: housing is recovering; shale gas and oil will reduce energy costs and boost competitiveness; job creation is improving; rising labour costs in Asia and the advent of robotics and automation are underpinning a manufacturing resurgence; and aggressive quantitative easing is helping both the real economy and financial markets.

[quote]But risks remain. Unemployment and household debt remain stubbornly high. The fiscal drag from rising taxes and spending cuts will hit growth, and the political system is dysfunctional, with partisan polarization impeding compromise on the fiscal deficit, immigration, energy policy, and other key issues that influence potential growth.[/quote]

In sum, among advanced economies, the US is in the best relative shape, followed by Japan, where Abenomics is boosting confidence.

The eurozone and the UK remain mired in recessions made worse by tight monetary and fiscal policies. Among emerging economies, China could face a hard landing by late 2014 if critical structural reforms are postponed, and the other BRICs need to turn away from state capitalism. While other emerging markets in Asia and Latin America are showing more dynamism than the BRICs, their strength will not be enough to turn the global tide.

By Nouriel Roubini

Copyright: Project-Syndicate, 2013

Nouriel Roubini, a.k.a. “Doctor Doom”, is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Roubini has been consistently cited as one of the world’s top global thinkers after he was able to accurately describe the current economic crisis that began in 2008, many years prior to it happening. This year, he was voted as the most influential economist in the world by Forbes magazine.

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Monetary Missteps? – 10 Concerns About Quantitative Easing: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 07:16:31 +0000

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Central banks worldwide today are utilising unconventional monetary policies, such as quantitative easing, to jump-start growth in their anemic economies. But if such policies remain in place for too long, their side effects could be severe – and the longer-term costs very high.

NEW YORK – Most observers regard unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative easing (QE) as necessary to jump-start growth in today’s anemic economies. But questions about the effectiveness and risks of QE have begun to multiply as well. In particular, ten potential costs associated with such policies merit attention.

First, while a purely “Austrian” response (that is, austerity) to bursting asset and credit bubbles may lead to a depression, QE policies that postpone the necessary private- and public-sector deleveraging for too long may create an army of zombies: zombie financial institutions, zombie households and firms, and, in the end, zombie governments. So, somewhere between the Austrian and Keynesian extremes, QE needs to be phased out over time.

Second, repeated QE may become ineffective over time as the channels of transmission to real economic activity become clogged. The bond channel doesn’t work when bond yields are already low; and the credit channel doesn’t work when banks hoard liquidity and velocity collapses. Indeed, those who can borrow (high-grade firms and prime households) don’t want or need to, while those who need to – highly leveraged firms and non-prime households – can’t, owing to the credit crunch.

Moreover, the stock-market channel leading to asset reflation following QE works only in the short run if growth fails to recover. And the reduction in real interest rates via a rise in expected inflation when open-ended QE is implemented risks eventually stoking inflation expectations.

Third, the foreign-exchange channel of QE transmission – the currency weakening implied by monetary easing – is ineffective if several major central banks pursue QE at the same time. When that happens, QE becomes a zero-sum game, because not all currencies can fall, and not all trade balances can improve, simultaneously. The outcome, then, is “QE wars” as proxies for “currency wars.”

Fourth, QE in advanced economies leads to excessive capital flows to emerging markets, which face a difficult policy challenge. Sterilized foreign-exchange intervention keeps domestic interest rates high and feeds the inflows. But unsterilized intervention and/or reducing domestic interest rates creates excessive liquidity that can feed domestic inflation and/or asset and credit bubbles.

At the same time, forgoing intervention and allowing the currency to appreciate erodes external competitiveness, leading to dangerous external deficits. Yet imposing capital controls on inflows is difficult and sometimes leaky. Macro-prudential controls on credit growth are useful, but sometimes ineffective in stopping asset bubbles when low interest rates continue to underpin generous liquidity conditions.

Fifth, persistent QE can lead to asset bubbles both where it is implemented and in countries where it spills over. Such bubbles can occur in equity markets, housing markets (Hong Kong, Singapore), commodity markets, bond markets (with talk of a bubble increasing in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan), and credit markets (where spreads in some emerging markets, and on high-yield and high-grade corporate debt, are narrowing excessively).

[quote]Although QE may be justified by weak economic and growth fundamentals, keeping rates too low for too long can eventually feed such bubbles. That is what happened in 2000-2006, when the US Federal Reserve aggressively cut the federal funds rate to 1 percent during the 2001 recession and subsequent weak recovery and then kept rates down, thus fueling credit/housing/subprime bubbles.[/quote]

Sixth, QE can create moral-hazard problems by weakening governments’ incentive to pursue needed economic reforms. It may also delay needed fiscal austerity if large deficits are monetized, and, by keeping rates too low, prevent the market from imposing discipline.

Seventh, exiting QE is tricky. If exit occurs too slowly and too late, inflation and/or asset/credit bubbles could result. Also, if exit occurs by selling the long-term assets purchased during QE, a sharp increase in interest rates might choke off recovery, resulting in large financial losses for holders of long-term bonds. And, if the exit occurs via a rise in the interest rate on excess reserves (to sterilize the effect of a base-money overhang on credit growth), the ensuing losses for central banks’ balance sheets could be significant.

Eighth, an extended period of negative real interest rates implies a redistribution of income and wealth from creditors and savers toward debtors and borrowers. Of all the forms of adjustment that can lead to deleveraging (growth, savings, orderly debt restructuring, or taxation of wealth), debt monetization (and eventually higher inflation) is the least democratic, and it seriously damages savers and creditors, including pensioners and pension funds.

Ninth, QE and other unconventional monetary policies can have serious unintended consequences. Eventually, excessive inflation may erupt, or credit growth may slow, rather than accelerate, if banks – faced with very low net interest-rate margins – decide that risk relative to reward is insufficient.

Finally, there is a risk of losing sight of any road back to conventional monetary policies. Indeed, some countries are ditching their inflation-targeting regime and moving into uncharted territory, where there may be no anchor for price expectations. The US has moved from QE1 to QE2 and now to QE3, which is potentially unlimited and linked to an unemployment target. Officials are now actively discussing the merit of negative policy rates. And policymakers have moved to a risky credit-easing policy as QE’s effectiveness has waned.

[quote]In short, policies are becoming more unconventional, not less, with little clarity about short-term effects, unintended consequences, and long-term impacts. To be sure, QE and other unconventional monetary policies do have important short-term benefits. But if such policies remain in place for too long, their side effects could be severe – and the longer-term costs very high.[/quote]

By Nouriel Roubini

Copyright: Project-Syndicate, 2013

Nouriel Roubini, a.k.a. “Doctor Doom”, is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Roubini has been consistently cited as one of the world’s top global thinkers after he was able to accurately describe the current economic crisis that began in 2008, many years prior to it happening. This year, he was voted as the most influential economist in the world by Forbes magazine.

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The post Monetary Missteps? – 10 Concerns About Quantitative Easing: Nouriel Roubini appeared first on Economy Watch.

The 5 Biggest Risks To The Global Economy In 2013: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Tue, 22 Jan 2013 07:56:24 +0000

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While chances of a perfect economic storm in 2013 are low, the global economy still faces major risks this year – especially as fiscal austerity continues to spread to more advanced economies, leading to an increased risk of a hard landing in China and the threat of war in the Middle East. Any one of these risks alone will also be enough to stall the global economy and tip it into recession.

NEW YORK – The global economy this year will exhibit some similarities with the conditions that prevailed in 2012. No surprise there: we face another year in which global growth will average about 3 percent, but with a multi-speed recovery – a sub-par, below-trend annual rate of 1 percent in the advanced economies, and close-to-trend rates of 5 percent in emerging markets. But there will be some important differences as well.

Painful deleveraging – less spending and more saving to reduce debt and leverage – remains ongoing in most advanced economies, which implies slow economic growth. But fiscal austerity will envelop most advanced economies this year, rather than just the eurozone periphery and the United Kingdom. Indeed, austerity is spreading to the core of the eurozone, the United States, and other advanced economies (with the exception of Japan). Given synchronized fiscal retrenchment in most advanced economies, another year of mediocre growth could give way to outright contraction in some countries.

With growth anemic in most advanced economies, the rally in risky assets that began in the second half of 2012 has not been driven by improved fundamentals, but rather by fresh rounds of unconventional monetary policy. Most major advanced economies’ central banks – the European Central Bank, the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank – have engaged in some form of quantitative easing, and they are now likely to be joined by the Bank of Japan, which is being pushed toward more unconventional policies by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new government.

Moreover, several risks lie ahead:

First, America’s mini-deal on taxes has not steered it fully away from the fiscal cliff. Sooner or later, another ugly fight will take place on the debt ceiling, the delayed sequester of spending, and a congressional “continuing spending resolution” (an agreement to allow the government to continue functioning in the absence of an appropriations law). Markets may become spooked by another fiscal cliffhanger. And even the current mini-deal implies a significant amount of drag – about 1.4 percent of GDP – on an economy that has grown at barely a 2 percent rate over the last few quarters.

Second, while the ECB’s actions have reduced tail risks in the eurozone – a Greek exit and/or loss of market access for Italy and Spain – the monetary union’s fundamental problems have not been resolved. Together with political uncertainty, they will re-emerge with full force in the second half of the year.

[quote]After all, stagnation and outright recession – exacerbated by front-loaded fiscal austerity, a strong euro, and an ongoing credit crunch – remain Europe’s norm. As a result, large – and potentially unsustainable – stocks of private and public debt remain. Moreover, given aging populations and low productivity growth, potential output is likely to be eroded in the absence of more aggressive structural reforms to boost competitiveness, leaving the private sector no reason to finance chronic current-account deficits.[/quote]

Third, China has had to rely on another round of monetary, fiscal, and credit stimulus to prop up an unbalanced and unsustainable growth model based on excessive exports and fixed investment, high saving, and low consumption.

By the second half of the year, the investment bust in real estate, infrastructure, and industrial capacity will accelerate. And, because the country’s new leadership – which is conservative, gradualist, and consensus-driven – is unlikely to speed up implementation of reforms needed to increase household income and reduce precautionary saving, consumption as a share of GDP will not rise fast enough to compensate. So the risk of a hard landing will rise by the end of this year.

Fourth, many emerging markets – including the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), but also many others – are now experiencing decelerating growth.

[quote]Their “state capitalism” – a large role for state-owned companies; an even larger role for state-owned banks; resource nationalism; import-substitution industrialization; and financial protectionism and controls on foreign direct investment – is the heart of the problem. Whether they will embrace reforms aimed at boosting the private sector’s role in economic growth remains to be seen.[/quote]

Finally, serious geopolitical risks loom large. The entire greater Middle East – from the Maghreb to Afghanistan and Pakistan – is socially, economically, and politically unstable. Indeed, the Arab Spring is turning into an Arab Winter.

While an outright military conflict between Israel and the US on one side and Iran on the other side remains unlikely, it is clear that negotiations and sanctions will not induce Iran’s leaders to abandon efforts to develop nuclear weapons. With Israel refusing to accept a nuclear-armed Iran, and its patience wearing thin, the drums of actual war will beat harder. The fear premium in oil markets may significantly rise and increase oil prices by 20 percent, leading to negative growth effects in the US, Europe, Japan, China, India and all other advanced economies and emerging markets that are net oil importers.

[quote]While the chance of a perfect storm – with all of these risks materializing in their most virulent form – is low, any one of them alone would be enough to stall the global economy and tip it into recession. And while they may not all emerge in the most extreme way, each is or will be appearing in some form. As 2013 begins, the downside risks to the global economy are gathering force.[/quote]

By Nouriel Roubini

Copyright: Project-Syndicate, 2013

Nouriel Roubini, a.k.a. “Doctor Doom”, is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Roubini has been consistently cited as one of the world’s top global thinkers after he was able to accurately describe the current economic crisis that began in 2008, many years prior to it happening. This year, he was voted as the most influential economist in the world by Forbes magazine.

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Another Eurozone Crisis In 2014?: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Tue, 18 Dec 2012 05:22:08 +0000

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NEW YORK – The risks facing the eurozone have been reduced since the summer, when a Greek exit looked imminent and borrowing costs for Spain and Italy reached new and unsustainable heights. But, while financial strains have since eased, economic conditions on the eurozone’s periphery remain shaky.

Several factors account for the reduction in risks. For starters, the European Central Bank’s “outright monetary transactions” program has been incredibly effective: interest-rate spreads for Spain and Italy have fallen by about 250 basis points, even before a single euro has been spent to purchase government bonds. The introduction of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which provides another €500 billion ($650 billion) to be used to backstop banks and sovereigns, has also helped, as has European leaders’ recognition that a monetary union alone is unstable and incomplete, requiring deeper banking, fiscal, economic, and political integration.

But, perhaps most important, Germany’s attitude toward the eurozone in general, and Greece in particular, has changed. German officials now understand that, given extensive trade and financial links, a disorderly eurozone hurts not just the periphery but the core. They have stopped making public statements about a possible Greek exit, and just supported a third bailout package for the country. As long as Spain and Italy remain vulnerable, a Greek blowup could spark severe contagion before Germany’s election next year, jeopardizing Chancellor Angela Merkel’s chances of winning another term. So Germany will continue to finance Greece for the time being.

[quote]Nonetheless, the eurozone periphery shows little sign of recovery: GDP continues to shrink, owing to ongoing fiscal austerity, the euro’s excessive strength, a severe credit crunch underpinned by banks’ shortage of capital, and depressed business and consumer confidence. Moreover, recession on the periphery is now spreading to the eurozone core, with French output contracting and even Germany stalling as growth in its two main export markets is either falling (the rest of the eurozone) or slowing (China and elsewhere in Asia).[/quote]

Moreover, balkanization of economic activity, banking systems, and public-debt markets continues, as foreign investors flee the eurozone periphery and seek safety in the core. Private and public debt levels are high and possibly unsustainable. After all, the loss of competitiveness that led to large external deficits remains largely unaddressed, while adverse demographic trends, weak productivity gains, and slow implementation of structural reforms depress potential growth.

To be sure, there has been some progress in the eurozone periphery in the last few years: fiscal deficits have been reduced, and some countries are now running primary budget surpluses (the fiscal balance excluding interest payments). Likewise, competitiveness losses have been partly reversed as wages have lagged productivity growth, thus reducing unit labor costs, and some structural reforms are ongoing.

But, in the short run, austerity, lower wages, and reforms are recessionary, while the adjustment process in the eurozone has been asymmetric and recessionary/deflationary. The countries that were spending more than their incomes have been forced to spend less and save more, thereby reducing their trade deficits; but countries like Germany, which were over-saving and running external surpluses, have not been forced to adjust by increasing domestic demand, so their trade surpluses have remained large.

Meanwhile, the monetary union remains an unstable disequilibrium: either the eurozone moves toward fuller integration (capped by political union to provide democratic legitimacy to the loss of national sovereignty on banking, fiscal, and economic affairs), or it will undergo disunion, dis-integration, fragmentation, and eventual breakup. And, while European Union leaders have issued proposals for a banking and fiscal union, now Germany is pushing back.

German leaders fear that the risk-sharing elements of deeper integration (the ESM’s recapitalization of banks, a common resolution fund for insolvent banks, eurozone-wide deposit insurance, greater EU fiscal authority, and debt mutualization) imply a politically unacceptable transfer union whereby Germany and the core unilaterally and permanently subsidize the periphery. Germany thus believes that the periphery’s problems are not the result of the absence of a banking or fiscal union; rather, on the German view, large fiscal deficits and debt reflect low potential growth and loss of competitiveness due to the lack of structural reforms.

Of course, Germany fails to recognize that successful monetary unions like the United States have a full banking union with significant risk-sharing elements, and a fiscal union whereby idiosyncratic shocks to specific states’ output are absorbed by the federal budget. The US is also a large transfer union, in which richer states permanently subsidize the poorer ones.

At the same time, while proposals for a banking, fiscal, and political union are being mooted, there is little discussion of how to restore growth in the short run. Europeans are willing to tighten their belts, but they need to see a light at the end of the tunnel in the form of income and job growth.

[quote]If recessions deepen, the social and political backlash against austerity will become overwhelming: strikes, riots, violence, demonstrations, the rise of extremist political parties, and the collapse of weak governments. And, to stabilize debt/GDP ratios, the denominator must start rising; otherwise, debt levels will become unsustainable, despite all efforts to reduce deficits.[/quote]

The tail risks of a Greek exit from the eurozone or a massive loss of market access in Italy and Spain have been reduced for 2013. But the fundamental crisis of the eurozone has not been resolved, and another year of muddling through could revive these risks in a more virulent form in 2014 and beyond. Unfortunately, the eurozone crisis is likely to remain with us for years to come, sustaining the likelihood of coercive debt restructurings and eurozone exits.

By Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini, a.k.a. “Doctor Doom”, is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Roubini has been consistently cited as one of the world’s top global thinkers after he was able to accurately describe the current economic crisis that began in 2008, many years prior to it happening. This year, he was voted as the most influential economist in the world by Forbes magazine.

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The Global Stock Market Rally Is Over… & The Worst Is Yet To Come: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 07:45:41 +0000

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Equity markets around the world have begun on to fall once more – after enjoying a brief rally that started in July – as consumers, firms, and investors become more cautious and risk-averse. Given the seriousness of the downside risks to growth, the latest correction may prove to be a bellwether of worse to come for the global economy and financial markets in 2013.

NEW YORK – The upswing in global equity markets that started in July is now running out of steam, which comes as no surprise: with no significant improvement in growth prospects in either the advanced or major emerging economies, the rally always seemed to lack legs. If anything, the correction might have come sooner, given disappointing macroeconomic data in recent months.

Starting with the advanced countries, the eurozone recession has spread from the periphery to the core, with France entering recession and Germany facing a double whammy of slowing growth in one major export market (China/Asia) and outright contraction in others (southern Europe).

Economic growth in the United States has also remained anemic, at 1.5-2 percent for most of the year, and Japan is lapsing into a new recession. The United Kingdom, like the eurozone, has already endured a double-dip recession, and now even strong commodity exporters – Canada, the Nordic countries, and Australia – are slowing in the face of headwinds from the US, Europe, and China.

Meanwhile, emerging-market economies – including all of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and other major players like Argentina, Turkey, and South Africa – also slowed in 2012. China’s slowdown may be stabilized for a few quarters, given the government’s latest fiscal, monetary, and credit injection; but this stimulus will only perpetuate the country’s unsustainable growth model, one based on too much fixed investment and savings and too little private consumption.

[quote]In 2013, downside risks to global growth will be exacerbated by the spread of fiscal austerity to most advanced economies. Until now, the recessionary fiscal drag has been concentrated in the eurozone periphery and the UK. But now it is permeating the eurozone’s core.[/quote]

And in the US, even if President Barack Obama and the Republicans in Congress agree on a budget plan that avoids the looming “fiscal cliff,” spending cuts and tax increases will invariably lead to some drag on growth in 2013 – at least 1 percent of GDP. In Japan, the fiscal stimulus from post-earthquake reconstruction will be phased out, while a new consumption tax will be phased in by 2014.

The International Monetary Fund is thus absolutely right in arguing that excessively front-loaded and synchronized fiscal austerity in most advanced economies will dim global growth prospects in 2013. So, what explains the recent rally in US and global asset markets?

The Limits Of Quantitative Easing

The answer is simple: Central banks have turned on their liquidity hoses again, providing a boost to risky assets. The US Federal Reserve has embraced aggressive, open-ended quantitative easing (QE). The European Central Bank’s announcement of its “outright market transactions” program has reduced the risk of a sovereign-debt crisis in the eurozone periphery and a breakup of the monetary union. The Bank of England has moved from QE to CE (credit easing), and the Bank of Japan has repeatedly increased the size of its QE operations.

Monetary authorities in many other advanced and emerging-market economies have cut their policy rates as well. And, with slow growth, subdued inflation, near-zero short-term interest rates, and more QE, longer-term interest rates in most advanced economies remain low (with the exception of the eurozone periphery, where sovereign risk remains relatively high). It is small wonder, then, that investors desperately searching for yield have rushed into equities, commodities, credit instruments, and emerging-market currencies.

Downside Risks & Global Uncertainties

But now a global market correction seems underway, owing, first and foremost, to the poor growth outlook. At the same time, the eurozone crisis remains unresolved, despite the ECB’s bold actions and talk of a banking, fiscal, economic, and political union. Specifically, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy are still at risk, while bailout fatigue pervades the eurozone core.

Moreover, political and policy uncertainties – on the fiscal, debt, taxation, and regulatory fronts – abound. In the US, the fiscal worries are threefold: the risk of a “cliff” in 2013, as tax increases and massive spending cuts kick in automatically if no political agreement is reached; renewed partisan combat over the debt ceiling; and a new fight over medium-term fiscal austerity. In many other countries or regions – for example, China, Korea, Japan, Israel, Germany, Italy, and Catalonia – upcoming elections or political transitions have similarly increased policy uncertainty.

[quote]Yet another reason for the correction is that valuations in stock markets are stretched: price/earnings ratios are now high, while growth in earnings per share is slackening, and will be subject to further negative surprises as growth and inflation remain low. With uncertainty, volatility, and tail risks on the rise again, the correction could accelerate quickly.[/quote]

Indeed, there are now greater geopolitical uncertainties as well: the risk of an Iran-Israel military confrontation remains high as negotiations and sanctions may not deter Iran from developing nuclear-weapons capacity; a new war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza is likely; the Arab Spring is turning into a grim winter of economic, social, and political instability; and territorial disputes in Asia between China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam are inflaming nationalist forces.

As consumers, firms, and investors become more cautious and risk-averse, the equity-market rally of the second half of 2012 has crested. And, given the seriousness of the downside risks to growth in advanced and emerging economies alike, the correction could be a bellwether of worse to come for the global economy and financial markets in 2013.

By Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini, a.k.a. “Doctor Doom”, is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Roubini has been consistently cited as one of the world’s top global thinkers after he was able to accurately describe the current economic crisis that began in 2008, many years prior to it happening. This year, he was voted as the most influential economist in the world by Forbes magazine.

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The post The Global Stock Market Rally Is Over… & The Worst Is Yet To Come: Nouriel Roubini appeared first on Economy Watch.

Hard To Be Easing – Why QE3 Cannot Prevent A Fiscal Drag: Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini — Mon, 15 Oct 2012 06:30:34 +0000

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The US Federal Reserve’s third round of quantitative easing, or QE3, has many observers arguing that the effects on risky assets could be greater than in previous rounds. But, despite the Fed’s commitment to aggressive monetary easing, QE3’s effects on the real economy and on US equities could well be smaller and more fleeting.

NEW YORK – The United States Federal Reserve’s decision to undertake a third round of quantitative easing, or QE3, has raised three important questions. Will QE3 jump-start America’s anemic economic growth? Will it lead to a persistent increase in risky assets, especially in US and other global equity markets? Finally, will its effects on GDP growth and equity markets be similar or different?

Many now argue that QE3’s effect on risky assets should be as powerful, if not more so, than that of QE1, QE2, and “Operation Twist,” the Fed’s earlier bond-purchase program. After all, while the previous rounds of US monetary easing have been associated with a persistent increase in equity prices, the size and duration of QE3 are more substantial. But, despite the Fed’s impressive commitment to aggressive monetary easing, its effects on the real economy and on US equities could well be smaller and more fleeting than those of previous QE rounds.

Consider, first, that the previous QE rounds came at times of much lower equity valuations and earnings. In March 2009, the S&P 500 index was down to 660, earnings per share (EPS) of US companies and banks had sunk to a financial-crisis low, and price/earnings ratios were in the single digits. Today, the S&P 500 is more than 100 percent higher (hovering near 1,430), the average EPS is close to $100, and P/E ratios are above 14.

Even during QE2, in the summer of 2010, the S&P 500, P/E ratios, and EPS were much lower than they are today. If, as is likely, economic growth in the US remains anemic in spite of QE3, top-line revenues and bottom-line earnings will turn south, with negative effects on equity valuations.

Moreover, fiscal support is absent this time: QE1 and QE2 helped to prevent a deeper recession and avoid a double dip, respectively, because each was associated with a significant fiscal stimulus. In contrast, QE3 will be associated with a fiscal contraction, possibly even a large fiscal cliff.

[quote]Even if the US avoids the full fiscal cliff of 4.5 percent of GDP that is looming at the end of the year, it is highly likely that a fiscal drag amounting to 1.5 percent of GDP will hit the economy in 2013. With the US economy currently growing at a 1.6 percent annual rate, a fiscal drag of even 1 percent implies near-stagnation in 2013, though a modest recovery in housing and manufacturing, together with QE3, should keep US growth at about its current level in 2013.[/quote]

But there is no broader rebound underway. In both 2010 and 2011, leading economic indicators showed that the first-half slowdown had bottomed out, and that growth was already accelerating before the announcement of monetary easing. Thus, QE nudged along an economy that was already recovering, which prolonged asset reflation.

By contrast, the latest data suggest that the US economy is performing as sluggishly now as it was in the first half of the year. Indeed, if anything, weakness in the US labour market, low capital expenditures, and slow income growth have contradicted signals in the early summer that third-quarter growth might be more robust.

Meanwhile, the main transmission channels of monetary stimulus to the real economy – the bond, credit, currency, and stock markets – remain weak, if not broken. Indeed, the bond-market channel is unlikely to boost growth. Long-term government bond yields are already very low, and a further reduction will not significantly change private agents’ borrowing costs.

The credit channel also is not working properly, as banks have hoarded most of the extra liquidity from QE, creating excess reserves rather than increasing lending. Those who can borrow have ample cash and are cautious about spending, while those who want to borrow – highly indebted households and firms (especially small and medium-size enterprises) – face a credit crunch.

The currency channel is similarly impaired. With global growth weakening, net exports are unlikely to improve robustly, even with a weaker dollar. Moreover, many major central banks are implementing variants of QE alongside the Fed, dampening the effect of the Fed’s actions on the dollar’s value.

Perhaps most important, a weaker dollar’s effect on the trade balance, and thus on growth, is limited by two factors. First, a weaker dollar is associated with a higher dollar price for commodities, which implies a drag on the trade balance, because the US is a net commodity-importing country. Second, any improvement in GDP derived from stronger exports leads to an increase in imports. Empirical studies estimate that the overall impact of a weaker US dollar on the trade balance is close to zero.

The only other significant channel to transmit QE to the real economy is the wealth effect of an equity-market increase, but there is some circularity in the argument that QE3 will lead to a persistent rise in equity prices. If persistent asset reflation requires a significant GDP growth recovery, it is tautological to say that if equity prices rise enough following QE, the resulting increase in GDP from a wealth effect justifies the rise in asset prices. If monetary policy’s transmission channels to the real economy are broken, one cannot assume that QE will have a significant effect on economic growth.

Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has recently emphasized the importance of an additional channel: the confidence channel, through which the Fed’s commitment to maintaining generous monetary conditions for longer could improve private spending. The issue is how substantial and durable such effects will be. Confidence is fragile in an environment characterized by ongoing deleveraging, macro uncertainties, weak labour-market growth, and a fiscal drag.

[quote]In short, QE3 reduces the tail risk of an outright economic contraction, but is unlikely to lead to a sustained recovery in an economy that is still enduring a painful deleveraging process. In the short run, QE3 will lead investors to take on risk, and will stimulate modest asset reflation. But the equity-price rise is likely to fizzle out over time if economic growth disappoints, as is likely, and drags down expectations about corporate revenues and profitability. [/quote]

By Nouriel Roubini

Nouriel Roubini, a.k.a. “Doctor Doom”, is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor of economics at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Roubini has been consistently cited as one of the world’s top global thinkers after he was able to accurately describe the current economic crisis that began in 2008, many years prior to it happening. This year, he was voted as the most influential economist in the world by Forbes magazine.

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The post Hard To Be Easing – Why QE3 Cannot Prevent A Fiscal Drag: Nouriel Roubini appeared first on Economy Watch.