Times of Trouble: Can Christine Lagarde Lead the IMF Through its Toughest Period?

By: Raghuram Rajan   Date: 11 July 2011

About The Author

Raghuram Rajan

Eric J. Gleacher Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the Booth School of Business at the

Raghuram Rajan, EconomyWatch Contributor

 

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To most regular observers, the appointment of Christine Lagarde as IMF’s Managing Director came as no surprise. Lagarde had been seen as the overwhelming favourite to replace Dominique Strauss-Kahn and was duly elected despite calls for a candidate from an emerging economy. However, the challenges for Lagarde are great. While Lagarde may undoubtedly have the credentials to run one of the world’s most influential financial organisations, doubts will remain over her actual ability until she proves herself worthy of the role. Former IMF Chief Economist Raghuram Rajan believes that Lagarde arrives at a pivotal, but extremely challenging, period for the IMF wherein her success, or failure, may have a deep impact for the world economy.

How Will Lagarde Lift The IMF and The World Economy?

How Will Lagarde Lift The IMF and the World Economy?
Credit: International Monetary Fund

CHICAGO – Now that the dust has settled over the selection of the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, the IMF can return to its core business of managing crises. Christine Lagarde, a competent and well-regarded technocrat, will have her hands full with three important challenges.

See the Slide Show >>> The Evolution of Christine Lagarde’s Career

The first, and probably easiest, challenge is to restore the IMF’s public image. While the criminal case against Dominique Strauss-Kahn on sexual-assault charges now seems highly uncertain, the ensuing press focus on the IMF suggests an uncontrolled international bureaucracy with unlimited expense accounts, dominated by men with little sense of restraint.

Fortunately, the truth is more prosaic. Top IMF staff face strict limits on their allowable business expenses (no $3,000 per night hotel rooms, despite reports in the press), and are generally underpaid relative to private-sector executives with similar skills and experience.

Related: The Economics of Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s Allegations

The IMF, like many organizations where workers spend long trips together, has its share of intra-office romances. But the environment is professional, and not hostile to women. A previous incident in which Strauss-Kahn was let off lightly for an improper relationship with a subordinate clearly suggests that the Fund needs brighter lines for acceptable behaviour and tougher punishment for transgressions. But other organizations have dealt with similar issues; the IMF needs to make the necessary changes, and, equally important, get the message out that the DSK incident was an aberration, not the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

The second, and perhaps most difficult, challenge facing Lagarde, is the mess in Europe, where the IMF has become overly entangled in eurozone politics. Typically, the IMF assesses whether a country, after undertaking reasonable belt-tightening measures, can service its debt – and lends only when it is satisfied that it can. The entire objective of IMF lending is to help finance the country while it makes adjustments and regains access to private borrowing. This also means that a country with too much debt should renegotiate it down before getting help from the IMF, thereby avoiding an unsustainable repayment burden.

Perhaps swayed by promises of eurozone financial support (and Europe’s desire to prevent default-fueled financial contagion from spreading to countries like Spain and possibly Italy), the IMF took a rosier view of debt sustainability in countries like Greece than it has in emerging markets. But this has not “helped” such countries, for the availability of soft credit from the eurozone or the Fund only enables a greater accumulation of debt.

Ultimately, debt can be repaid only if a country produces more than it spends. And the higher the debt, the less likely it is that the country will be able to achieve the mix of belt-tightening and growth that would enable it to generate the necessary surpluses. Delayed restructuring eventually means more painful restructuring – after many years of lost growth.

If troubled eurozone countries, especially Spain, start growing rapidly again, there is still a “muddle-through” outcome that might work. With too-big-to-save countries like Spain in the clear, the debt of highly-indebted peripheral countries like Greece could be written down through interest waivers, maturity extensions, and debt exchanges. The eurozone – and the European Union – could survive its fiscal crisis intact.

Related: Eurozone Divorce Imminent: Nouriel Roubini

But having failed to insist on an up-front restructuring, the IMF will face problems. With private investors reluctant to lend more or even to roll over existing debt, the bulk of Greek debt at the time of any restructuring (or whatever it is euphemistically called) will be from the official sector. How the resulting losses imposed on debt holders will be divided between the various eurozone institutions and the IMF is anyone’s guess. For the first time in its history, the Fund might have to take a significant “haircut” on its loans, and it will have to prepare its non-European shareholders for it.

The Evolution of Christine Lagarde’s Career
View the Slide Show

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